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MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION IN OHIO
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE ADOPTION of aggressive municipal annexation programs by many
cities in Ohio has often resulted in controversy. This is especially true
in the City of Akron where recent attempts to annex large sections of
neighboring townships have met with strong resistance from residents. The
animosity created by this issue has made cooperation between the city
and the townships virtually impossible, resulting in both an ineffective govern-
ment and an inefficient use of resources. To resolve this conflict, the parties
have engaged in protracted legal battles which test recent statutory changes in
the law of annexation in Ohio. The outcome of these cases may lead to
significant developments in the legal arsenal of annexation opponents. This
comment will examine policy considerations both supporting and opposing
annexation as well as the statutory scheme for annexation in Ohio, placing
special emphasis on recent court tests.'
II. ANNEXATION IN GENERAL: PROS AND CONS
Annexation is the addition of territory to a municipal corpora-
tion as an integral part. Generally, it involves joining all or part of
the territory of an unincorporated, less populous or subordinate local
unit to that of a larger unit, usually incorporated, offering a more com-
plete array of municipal services.'
This definition captures what the proponents of annexation see as its
major benefit: promotion of orderly urban growth.8 It embodies the concept
that municipal boundaries do not stop municipal problems and that a
certain amount of interdependence exists between the city and its environs.'
Proponents of annexation speak of the significant difficulties inherent in
fragmented governmental units: conflicts in authority, duplication of serv-
ices, dissipation of tax resources through inefficient spending policies and
a general lack of cooperation.' Moreover, annexation may be the only
way to provide fringe areas with much needed municipal services such as
sewers, water, and garbage disposal. One advocate identifies six specific
reasons for annexing land bordering a core city:
1. The fringe area is needed by the city for continued orderly growth
and the prosperity of the metropolitan area.
I would like to thank Marvin G. Manes, Esq., of the firm Oestreicher, Sternberg & Manes
for his support and confidence which have led to many of the ideas which form the basis
of this comment.
2 NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, ADjuSTING MuNIcnAxL BouNDA=nS 1 (1966) (hereinafter
cited as NATIONAL LEAGUE).
3 F. SENGSTOCK, ANNEXATION: A SOLITION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEM 5-6(1960).
'Comment, Municipal Annexation in Tennessee, 47 TENN. L. Rnv. 651 (1980).
SENGSTOCK, supra note 3, at 117.
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2. Fringe lands are needed so that public service facilities such as
water and sewer systems, street extensions, and recreational facili-
ties may be planned and provided on a rational and economic basis.
3. The fringe area may be brought within and developed under city
land use controls; e.g., planning, zoning housing codes, and build-
ing regulations.
4. The fringe regions may be subject to city protective regulations
and receive city police and fire services.
5. The fringe area may be subjected to city health and sanitation
regulations and receive these services.
6. Residents of the fringe area actually benefit from many of the serv-
ices and facilities provided by city government and should bear
their full share of the costs.'
It must be acknowledged that when reasonable and well-planned an-
nexation is accomplished for these reasons, it can truly benefit a metropoli-
tan area. Notably absent from the prior list, however, is the use of annex-
ation for the purpose of increasing the tax base of the city. One commentator
has strong views on this subject:
So-called land grabs for additional tax revenues, for increasing the
area or population of the city as an end in itself, and competitive
annexation to thwart anticipated annexation by another jurisdiction,
have usually proved to be unwise actions. Responsible city administra-
tions recognize these reasons as specious and unsound and reject propos-
als based upon them .... "'
There is an additional argument made by the proponents of annexation
which is especially relevant to this inquiry: it promotes the right of in-
dividuals to determine in which governmental unit their land is to be located."
Owners of property adjacent to a municipal corporation often have a keen
interest in seeking annexation: property values often increase through an-
nexation because of increased potential for development and availability
of services provided by the city.9 Many states, including Ohio,"0 have rec-
ognized this right by providing for annexation on petition of a certain
percentage of the owners of property contiguous to the municipal corpo-
ration." Nonetheless, it is when the interests of those seeking annexation
conflict with those of annexation opponents that tensions rise and legal
battles occur.
6 NATIONAL LEAoUE, supra note 2, at 1-2. For a discussion of the last point see C. ADRIAN
& C. PRESS, GOVERNING URBAN AMEuCA 52-53 (4th ed. 1966).
7 NATIONAL LEAGUE, supra note 2, at 2.
8 SENGSTOCK, supra note 3, at 52-54.
9 Id. at 52-53. Conversely, owners of real estate may vehemently oppose annexation, especially
when it will result in increased property taxes and insurance rates.
'0 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 709.02-.12 (Page 1976 & Supp. 1980).
1' SENGSTOCK, supra note 3, at 52.
[Vol. 14:4
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If annexation can be so beneficial to a municipal area, why are residents
of the fringe areas many times so vehemently opposed to it? At the center of
this resistance are, most likely, the very sociological and political reasons that
led the individual to decide to live in an area bordering the city. One prime
reason, for example, is economic.12 Property taxes are often much lower and
the resident of a fringe area is not usually subject to the city's personal in-
come tax. A second reason is political. Big city government is often viewed as
corrupt and inaccessible.1" There is a strong desire for local control and a
belief that local governments better serve the needs of their residents:
Local wishes may call for luxury services, for minimal services or
for some level in between. Wealthy people do not want to be forced into
a single mold by the creation of one legal entity for the whole area
because they can afford, and often wish to have, luxury services which
core-city government would not be likely to provide.
In contrast, one finds in modest suburbs a violent dislike and fear
of the core-city. In these areas residents can barely afford to own
their own homes. They want minimal services because they fear that
even a small increase in costs through 'unnecessary' services, for ex-
ample, might force them out of the homeowning category with all its
prestige and psychological satisfaction. To these people, joining the
core-city would mean buying a package of services that they feel they
can do without and cannot afford.14
There is a third reason why fringe residents oppose annexation: they
view their local community as a haven from such urban problems as crime
and poverty. Proponents of annexation, on the other hand, often attach an
insidious significance to such reasoning: "Very often the fringe is a haven
of the middle class which seeks to avoid any moral responsibility that it
may have toward the blighted areas of a city by retreating to the seclusion
of outlying areas, securing to themselves freedom from the burden of in-
creased taxation."' 5 Allegations of this kind have been prevalent in many
annexation battles. By far the most extreme example is an accusation made
by the City of Akron Law Director that township opposition to annexation
is racially motivated."6 Whether or not based on reality, such comments do
little to ease the already rampant animosity that exists in an annexation
proceeding.
Consequently, it becomes clear that a reasonable, well developed long-
range program of annexation may benefit the whole metropolitan area.
"2 Id. at 4-5.
13 Id. at 5. See also C. ADRIA N & C. PRESs, supra note 6, at 56.
'4 C. ADRiAN & C. Paass, supra note 6, at 56.
15 SEN OSTOCK, supra note 3, at 5.
16 Akron Beacon Journal, Aug. 29, 1980, § B, at 3, col. 6. Mr. Robert Pritt, Director of
Law, was quoted as saying, "They don't want black kids in their schools. That's the hidden
agenda. They don't say it that way; they're too clever. They say 'our schools, our neighbor-
hoods.",
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When annexation serves the needs of both the annexing city by allowing
orderly urban growth and the majority of fringe area by supplying needed
services, it is difficult to hypothesize legitimate objections. When possible,
of course, the rights of individual landowners to have their land annexed
should be respected. Nonetheless, it is possible to conceive of a situation
where the interests of individual landowners to self-determination conflict
with the desires of other fringe residents to remain unassociated with the
city. Imagine a large, highly developed parcel of land. The owner, in need
of city services, petitions the city for annexation. His or her right to self-de-
termination should certainly be respected. But what happens when the an-
nexation of this territory causes a tax loss to the remaining portion of the
township so that its ability to provide essential services is threatened? Thus,
residents of the township may be faced with two options: seeking annex-
ation themselves or doing without essential services. Such a conflict presents
a strong test of the viability of a state's annexation method. In Ohio, such a
situation is presently being litigated in two pending cases: Carlyn v. Davis
and In re Annexation of 247.5 Acres. 8 The outcome of these cases may
well provide the direction for future annexations in Ohio. Before these cases
are discussed, however, it is necessary to outline Ohio's statutory provision
for annexation and examine in detail the provisions under which these cases
are litigated.
III. THE STATUTORY SCHEME IN OHIO
Annexation in Ohio falls into three broad statutory categories: an-
nexation of unincorporated territory to a municipal corporation on appli-
cation by a majority of landowners in the territory sought to be annexed,"9
annexation of unincorporated territory upon the application of the municipal
corporation,"0 and annexation of all or part of a municipal corporation to
another municipal corporation." The latter procedure, however, encom-
passes the consolidation or merger of municipal corporations and is beyond
the scope of this comment.2
Annexation by application of landowners represents the most stream-
lined and easily accomplished procedure. A petition, signed by a majority
of owners 3 of territory adjacent to a municipal corporation is filed with the
17 No. 9819 (Summit Co. Ct. App., Feb. 25, 1981) motion to certify filed, No. 81-459 (March
20, 1981).
18 No. 9831 (Summit Co. Ct. App., April 15, 1981).
29 OHio REV. CODE ANN, §§ 709.02-.12 (Page 1976 & Supp. 1980).
20 d. §§ 709.13-.21.
21 Id. §§ 709.22-.37.
22 Dwyer & Fordham, Municipal Incorporation and Territorial Changes in Ohio, 13 Omo
ST. L.J., 503, 517 (1952).
23 "'[O]wner' or 'owners' means any adult individual seized of a freehold estate in land
who is legally competent and any firm, trustee or private corporation that is seized of a
freehold estate in land.... " Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 709.02 (Page Supp, 1980).
(Vol. 14:4
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board of county commissioners. The petition must contain a full legal de-
scription and an accurate map or plat of the territory to be annexed, a
statement of the number of owners of real estate in the territory, and the
name of the person or persons designated agent for the petitioners.' A pub-
lic hearing on the petition is held, at which the board of county commission-
ers hears testimony and evidence offered by both proponents and opponents
of the annexation." After the hearing the board must grant the petition if
it finds the following: the statutory requirements for the content of the peti-
tion and notice of the hearing have been met, the persons who signed the
petition are owners and constitute a majority of landowners, the map is ac-
curate, the territory is not unreasonably large, and the general good of the
territory to be annexed is served by granting the petition. 6 If the petition
is approved, the transcript of the proceedings is placed before the legislative
authority of the annexing municipal corporation for acceptance.? Any in-
terested person may file with the court of common pleas a petition seeking
an injunction against the annexation." Such a person must allege and prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the board's decision is unreasonable
or unlawful or that there was some error in the proceedings.
A municipal corporation may expand its borders by petitioning the
board of county commissioners to allow it to annex unincorporated terri-
tory."0 If the territory is owned by the municipal corporation, no further pro-
ceedings are necessary. 0 If not, an election of the annexation scheme by the
voters in the territory sought to be annexed must be held. 1 If the voters
approve the proposal, the petition proceeds in the same manner as one filed
by the owners."2 Such a petition, however, is still subject to the limited dis-
cretion of the board of county commissioners.
IV. UNREASONABLY LARGE AND THE GENERAL GOOD:
ELEMENTS IN THE COMMISSIONER'S DISCRETION
In Part II of this comment, we examined some of the policy reasons
241d.
2 5 Id.
2 6 Id. § 709.033 (Page 1976). For a full discussion of the board's findings see text Part IV
infra.
27 Id. § 709.04 (Page 1976).
2 ld. § 709.07 (Page Supp. 1980). Prior to January, 1980, only "persons interested" could
file for a petition for an injunction against the annexation. This phrase was defined as limited
to residents of the area to be annexed. Weber v. Williams, 32 Ohio App. 2d 65, 288
N.E.2d 322 (Defiance Co. 1972). Eaton v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 45 Ohio App. 2d 316, 345
N.E.2d 87 (Summit Co. 1973). This meant that if territory had one owner and he petitioned
for annexation, no one would have standing to test the board's decision to grant the an-
nexation. The amendments expand the class of persons eligible to file the action to include
any person who appeared at the public hearing.
29 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 709.13-.15 (Page 1976 & Supp. 1980).
301d. § 709.16 (Page 1976).
31 Id. § 709.17.
321d. § 709.16.
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behind the decision whether or not to allow a municipal corporation to an-
nex fringe areas. When it is necessary to allow a city to maintain orderly
growth, when it will provide needed city services to outlying areas,
or when individual owners of adjacent land seek it for legitimate
purposes, annexation should be allowed as the best means of accom-
plishing these goals. Residents of fringe areas, however, have a legitimate
interest in voicing their opposition, especially when the proposed annexation
violates their right to decide where they want to live. In concluding Section
II, we hypothesized a situation in which the interests of both proponents
and opponents of annexation were in conflict: when the tax loss to the fringe
government of a proposed annexation threatened the economic stability of
a local government. Such a situation, we concluded, would be an important
test of the viability of a state's approach to annexation. In Section III, we
examined Ohio's statutory scheme for annexation.33 In this Section, we shall
attempt to correlate the previous sections by analyzing Ohio's statutory
scheme to determine if the legitimate goals of annexation are embodied in
the statutes and if adequate safeguards are provided to prevent abuse by
overly-aggressive cities and to protect the rights of those who oppose an-
nexation.
Several general propositions quickly emerge from a cursory examina-
tion of the Ohio statutory scheme. First, the Ohio General Assembly favors
annexation. This is clear not only from the ease with which most annexa-
tions can be accomplished in Ohio, but also from an analysis of recent statu-
tory changes which will be discussed below. Second, the rights of individual
landowners to seek (or to approve) annexation are paramount. A petition
for annexation filed by a majority of landowners is subject to very little dis-
cretion in the decision-making process of the board of county commissioners.
Finally, at least on the face of the statute, there is very limited protection
for the rights of those opposed to annexation. Their participation in the an-
nexation proceedings is limited to an appearance at the public hearing to
voice their objections and, under certain circumstances, the right to file a
petition for an injunction against the annexation." If any protection is af-
forded these individuals, it is embodied in the limited discretion which the
board of county commissioners has in making its final decision of whether
to approve an annexation petition.35
In 1967 and 1969, the Ohio General Assembly made major revisions
in the statutes governing incorporation and annexation. The general effect
of these revisions has been to make annexation much easier and incorpora-
33 For an excellent discussion of the approaches taken by other states to the problem, see
SENOSTOCK, supra note 3, at 9-41; Comment, Municipal Annexation: An Urban Dilemma,
28 ALA. L. REv. 717, 720-33 (1977).
-, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 709.07 (Page 1976 & Supp. 1980).
33 Id. § 709.033 (Page 1976).
[Vol. 14:4
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tion more difficult. This result embodies an important policy reason in favor
of annexation: the avoidance of fragmented local governments and the en-
couragement of orderly urban growth. By making incorporation difficult and
annexation easy, the General Assembly clearly intended that existing cities
be allowed to grow and that areas ripe for incorporation be attached to
these cities rather than separately incorporated. These changes were accom-
plished in several ways. First, the class of persons eligible to petition for
annexation was expanded. Prior to 1967, only "adult freeholders residing
in the territory"3 could seek annexation. Thus, corporations and absentee
owners were excluded. 7 Under the present statute any owner, including
corporations and trustees, may file." Second, and more important, the dis-
cretion of the board of county commissioners in annexation proceedings
was severely curtailed. Under the prior statute the board, after the public
hearing, could grant the petition if it found, inter alia, that "It is right that
the prayer of the petition be granted."" Therefore, the board of county com-
missioners under the former annexation plan had almost unlimited discretion
in approving the petition."0 The enactment of section 709.033 of Title 7 of
the Ohio Revised Code diminished the board's discretion. As the Ohio Su-
preme Court in Lariccia v. Mahoning County Board of Commissioners"
held, "That statute [R.C. 709.033] establishes specific standards to be ap-
plied to the evidence before it in annexation proceedings and grants to the
board the discretion to make only those factual determinations specifically
called for in the statute.""2 The changes in the statutes on incorporation were
equally restrictive."1 Thus, the General Assembly clearly intended that, under
most circumstances, petitions for annexation should be granted. When a
board of county commissioners wishes to deny a petition, it can do so only
within the realm of one of its discretionary findings. These factual findings
are, therefore, the focus of the vast majority of legal tests of a board's deci-
sion. Through an analysis of these findings and the case law which has de-
veloped as a result, we can determine which policy considerations play im-
portant roles in Ohio annexation law.
The factual findings which the board of county commissioners must
361d. § 709.02 (amended 1967).
37See id. § 709.02 (Page Supp. 1980). That section's definition of "owner" is set out in
note 23 supra.
381d. § 709.02 (Page Supp. 1980).
80 Lariccia v. Mahoning County Bd. of Comm'rs, 38 Ohio St. 2d 99, 101, 310 N.E.2d 257,
258 (1974).
40 Dabkowski v. Baumann, 175 Ohio St. 89, 97, 191 N.E.2d 809, 811 (1963).
4138 Ohio St. 2d 99, 310 N.E.2d 257 (1974).
42 1d. at 101, 310 N.E.2d at 258.
,3 Most notable of these restrictions is found in Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 707.04 (Page 1976
& Supp. 1980) which suspends the operation of a petition for incorporation if the territory
sought to be incorporated is suitable for annexation to a neighboring municipal corporation.
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make before deciding an annexation petition are set forth in section 709.033
of Title 7 of the Ohio Revised Code:
After the hearing on a petition to annex, the board of county com-
missioners shall enter an order upon its journal allowing the annexation
if it finds that:
(A) The petition contains all matter required in section 709.02 of the
Revised Code.
(B) Notice has been published as required by section 709.031
[709.03.1] of the Revised Code.
(C) The persons whose names are subscribed to the petition are own-
ers of real estate located in the territory in the petition, and as of
the time the petition was filed with the board of county com-
missioners the number of valid signatures on the petition consti-
tuted a majority of the owners of real estate in the territory pro-
posed to be annexed.
(D) The territory included in the annexation petition is not unreason-
ably large; the map or plat is accurate; and the general good of
the territory sought to be annexed will be served if the annexation
petition is granted."
The findings regarding the statutory requirements of the petition and
notice, signatures on the petition, and accuracy of the map are administrative
in nature so that little case law has developed concerning them. 5 The other
two findings, whether the general good of the territory is served and whether
the territory is unreasonably large, entail much more discretion on behalf of
the board of county commissioners and, consequently have been more
thoroughly litigated.
Of these two findings, the determination as to the general good has
received the most attention from the courts. In Larriccia v. Mahoning County
Board of Commissioners the court said, "That statute [709.033] directs that
the ultimate focus of annexation proceedings be on 'the general good of the
territory sought to be annexed,' and requires granting of the petition when it
it is shown that such benefit will result."4 Over the years, several courts
have interpreted the concept of general good so that it is possible to delini-
ate their policy reasons behind its requirement.
44 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 709.33 (Page 1976).
45 There are some cases dealing with the accuracy of the map, although most arise in the
context of a petition for incorporation. See, e.g., Ohio Edison Co. v. McElrath, 60 Ohio Op.
462, 137 N.E.2d 642 (1955); Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Schaeffer, 69 O.L.A. 591, 119
N.E.2d 150 (1950); [1971] Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-069. For a discussion of interesting com-
ments regarding methods used to determine the number of owners in the territory, see [1980]
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-034; [1979] Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-043; [1973] Op. Att'y Gen. No.
73-048, and n. 69 infra.
4638 Ohio St. 2d 99, 102, 310 N.E.2d 257, 259 (1974).
(Vol. 14:4
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In In re Long"7 the court was presented with a petition for annexation
filed by the sole owner of seventy-eight acres of unincorporated territory.
The Board of Summit County Commissioners found that the general good
of the territory would not be served by the annexation and denied the peti-
tion. On appeal, the court reversed the Board's decision, holding that "terri-
tory" is defined as the owners and inhabitants of the area and that the mere
fact that the owner petitioned for annexation is strong evidence that the
general good of the territory will be served:
The word 'good' when used as a noun means happiness, prosperity,
or welfare. The word 'territory' being an inanimate object is certainly
not capable then of having a 'general good' and therefore when we
speak of territory as used in R.C. 709.033, the Legislature must have
meant the owners and inhabitants of the territory.
The petitioner here is the sole owner and, therefore, his desires
and intentions as to the happiness, prosperity and welfare of the terri-
tory should be given some weight and significance. "
In Eaton v. Summit County Board of Commissioners," the court dis-
cussed factors to be considered in determining whether the general good of
the territory would be served. Opponents of the annexation introduced evi-
dence that fire service to the annexed area would be inferior if annexation
were allowed. Proponents, including the owners, testified that the general
good would be served because annexation would permit the highest and
best use of the land through access to utilities and municipal services.50 The
court found that the Board of Summit County Commissioners' decision de-
nying the petition on the grounds that the general good was not served
was not based on a preponderance of the evidence and affirmed the lower
court's reversal of the denial.5
The petitioner in Lariccia v. Mahoning County Board of Commission-
ers" sought annexation of his store from a "dry" township to a city so that
he could sell alcoholic beverages. The court found that the fact that his
business would increase was sufficient to justify a finding that the general
good of the territory would be served. The court also found that testimony
of individuals living outside of the territory to be annexed was of little rele-
vance to the Board's determination. 3
Finally, in Toledo Trust Co. v. Lucas County Board of Commission-
47 26 Ohio Misc. 6, 268 N.E.2d 822 (C.P. Summit Co. 1970).
48 Id. at 8, 268 N.E.2d at 823.
49 49 Ohio App. 2d 24, 358 N.E.2d 1377 (Summit Co. 1974).
50 d. at 26-27, 358 N.E.2d at 1379.
31 Id.
52 38 Ohio St. 2d 99, 310 N.E.2d 257 (1974).
5340 Ohio App. 2d 251, 253-54, 318 N.E.2d 871, 874 (1973).
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ers,5" the court again affirmed the lower court's reversal of the Board's denial
of the petition for annexation. The Board of Commissioners of Lucas County
found that "it is not to the best interest of the people of Sylvania Township
to grant said petition."55
The court acknowledged that such a finding did not satisfy the require-
ment that the Board determine whether the general good of the territory
would be served by the annexation. The effect of annexation on the remain-
ing portion of the Township is not relevant to the finding of general good.
Rather, the scope of that determination is limited to the effect of the an-
nexation on the territory to be annexed. Since the Board made no finding as
to the general good and, in fact, heard no testimony relevant to such a
determination, the court found that the fact that a majority of landowners
signed the petition was sufficient to allow the annexation.5
It is evident that several of the policy considerations discussed in Part
II are embodied in the Ohio statutory requirement that the board, before
it can approve a petition, find that the general good of the territory to be
annexed is served. First of all, such a determination guarantees that the area
to be annexed will benefit from the annexation given that services to the
area will likely improve. As construed by the courts, however, this finding
serves a second, perhaps more important function: it furthers the legislative
intent that an owner have freedom to choose the governmental subdivision
in which his property will be located."
From the holding in In re Long that "territory" means the owners of
the area and the findings by the Larriccia and Toledo Trust courts that the
testimony of persons living outside that area to be annexed is of little im-
portance, it is clear that the judiciary has established what seems to be a
strong rebuttable presumption that if a majority of landowners sign the peti-
tion, then the general good of the territory is served by permitting the an-
nexation. Such a presumption makes it very difficult (if not impossible) for
opponents of annexation to win on this issue. 8 If they are to have any success
in stopping annexation, therefore, the battle must be won on the second of
the board's discretionary findings: that the territory to be annexed is not un-
reasonably large. 9
The board's finding as to whether the territory is unreasonably large
has been relegated by the courts to a minor role in annexation proceedings.
54 62 Ohio App. 2d 121, 404 N.E.2d 764 (Lucas Co. 1974).
55 Id. at 123, 404 N.E.2d at 766.
56 Id. at 123, 404 N.E.2d at 765.
571d. at 124, 404 N.E.2d at 766.
5BThere are no reported cases in which an otherwise valid annexation has been reversed
on this ground.
59 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 709.033(D) (Page Supp. 1980).
[Vol. 14:4
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It has rarely been applied in reported cases. Only within the last year has
this determination begun to emerge as a viable means to challenge annex-
ation. Such a role is difficult to explain" since a reading of the statute would
apparently mandate that it be given equal weight with the finding that the
general good of the annexed territory is served. The board of county com-
missioners is statutorily required to make both findings and a negative de-
termination on either is sufficient to defeat the annexation petition. Moreover,
since the finding of general good is very limited in scope, it seems likely
that the legislature intended that the unreasonably large determination cover
those policy considerations not embodied in the other finding. If that is
the case, then a broad interpretation of unreasonably large is necessary to
accomplish such goals. Several possible interpretations are proposed in the
following discussion.
The first reported case that discussed the finding of unreasonably large
is Dayton v. McPherson.1 In a lengthy and well-reasoned opinion the court
dealt with an attempt by the City of Vandalia to annex some 1460 acres,
including the Dayton Municipal Airport, owned by the City of Dayton.
Discussing whether the size of the territory made it unreasonably large, the
court examined the nature of the territory and whether it served the expan-
sionary needs of Vandalia:
Conceded, the acreage, per se, of the area to be annexed perhaps would
not have been unreasonably large, had it been unimproved open coun-
try needed for municipal expansion and development within Vandalia's
development capacity. However, the airport land and facilities devel-
oped to serve the highly specialized requirements of air passenger and
freight transportation . . . was not susceptible to growth and devel-
opment by Vandalia for residential, commercial and industrial pur-
poses, or any municipal purpose other than an airport.
For these reasons it follows that the airport, regardless of its size,
should not have been included in the annexation area, and its inclusion
makes the area per se . . . unreasonably large for Vandalia to serve."
This is an excellent example of how the need for a rational, long-range
approach to annexation can be embodied in the statutory requirements in
Ohio annexation law. At issue was not whether the airport would be better
served by Vandalia (although the court found that the benefit to the airport
would be minimal), but whether this annexation was necessary to promote
some legitimate purpose. Clearly, the only reason a city would attempt to
annex a highly developed and valuable airport would be to increase its tax
60 One possible explanation is that few annexations are on large enough a scale to warrant
a finding that the territory is unreasonably large.
61 29 Ohio Misc. 190, 280 N.E.2d 110 (C.P. Montgomery Co. 1970).
62 Id. at 219, 220, 280 N.E.2d at 120.
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base. The court found this purpose unsuitable and, as a result, denied the
petition on the grounds that the territory was unreasonably large.
In In re Kucharski,6 on the other hand, the court found that the peti-
tion to annex 895 acres of undeveloped land to the City of Dayton was
valid and that the territory was not unreasonably large. The Board of Com-
missioners of Montgomery County had based its decision that the territory
was unreasonably large on findings that the territory was located at a consid-
erable distance from the City, separated from it by a golf course, and that
there was a lack of accessibility to the area for police, fire and trash collec-
tion. The court held that such reasons do not support a finding that the
territory is unreasonably large.
The most expansive and liberal interpretation of unreasonably large
is found in the unreported decision of Herrick v. Summit County Board of
Commissioners." In that case, a petition was filed seeking the annexation
of approximately 445 acres from Twinsburg Township to the City of Twins-
burg. The territory sought to be annexed consisted of choice residential
property, owned solely by whites, and its annexation would leave the Town-
ship almost completely segregated and without means to support itself. The
Board of Summit County Commissioners found the territory unreasonably
large and the common pleas court agreed. The court of appeals affirmed,
holding that the testimony of individuals living outside the area,
although not relevant to the board's finding of general good under
Lariccia, was germane to the finding of whether the territory is
unreasonably large. The court, recognizing that the use of unreasonableness
is a term of relation which connotes aspects of comparison, suggested a
three-pronged analysis in determining whether territory is unreasonably
large:
(1) The geographic character, shape and size (acreage) of the terri-
tory to be annexed in relation to the territory to which it will be
annexed (the city), and in relation to the territory remaining after
the annexation is completed (the township) ...
(2) The ability of the annexing city to provide the necessary municipal
services to the added territory. (Geographic as well as 'financial'
largeness may be considered.)
(3) The effect on the remaining township territory if annexation is per-
mitted. If the territory sought to be annexed is so great a portion
of the township's tax base that the annexation would render the
remaining portion of the township incapable of supporting itself,
then the Board might reasonably conclude the proposed annexation
63 56 Ohio App. 2d 121, 381 N.E.2d 1131 (Montgomery Co. 1977).
44 No. 9425 (Summit Co. Ct. App., Jan. 23, 1980).
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is unreasonably large, although such annexation would benefit the
territory sought to be annexed. 5
This definition of unreasonably large would allow a board of county
commissioners to consider all of the relevant facts necessary to make an in-
formed decision on annexation. It permits the board to balance the wishes
of the individual owners against the needs of the community in general and,
thus, enables it to regulate annexations so that they proceed in an orderly
and reasonable manner.
It is against this background that two important cases have recently
been litigated: Carlyn v. Davis," (hereinafter referred to as "Goodyear
Aerospace") and In re Annexation of 247.5 Acres,67 (hereinafter referred
to as "Gilchrist Road."). These cases center around attempts by the City of
Akron to annex large, heavily industrialized parcels of land in Springfield
Township. The first of these was a petition, filed on behalf of the owner,
Goodyear Aerospace, Inc., seeking the annexation to the City of its 111 acre
industrial complex. The second was a petition, also filed on behalf of the
owners, seeking the annexation of 247.5 acres of a highly developed ware-
house complex on Gilchrist Road. After a long and involved legal battle
over procedure, 8 on June 3, 1980, the Board of Summit County Commis-
65 Id., slip op. at 6.
61 No. 9819 (Summit Co. Ct. App., Feb. 25, 1981) motion to certify filed, No. 81-457 (Mar.
20, 1981).
67 No. 9831 (Summit Co. Ct. App., April 15, 1981).
68 The history of the decisions of these petitions is extremely complicated. The two petitions
were filed on January 22, 1979. On the same day, the Village of Lakemore filed a petition
pursuant to OHno REv. CODE ANN. § 709.15 (Page 1976) seeking annexation of all of
Springfield Township, including the Goodyear Aerospace and Gilchrist Road parcels. Timely
public hearings were held regarding Goodyear and Gilchrist. The Lakemore petition was
set for public election in November, 1979. Meanwhile on June 1, 1979 the agent for
petitioners filed a second petition with the Board (Gilchrist 11) covering much of the same
territory in Gilchrist I (a few objecting landowners were deleted and some new parcels
were added). At that time the Board, despite statutory mandate to decide petitions within
ninety days of the public hearing, decided to delay decisions on Goodyear and Gilchrist
I until after the public election on the Lakemore petition. It also declined to take any
preliminary action on Gilchrist H. The agent for petitioners filed a writ of mandamus with
the court of appeals, which was granted. Holcomb v. Bd. of Summit Co. Comm'rs I, No.
9386 (Summit Co. Ct. App., filed Oct. 11, 1979). This decision was appealed by the
Board. Meanwhile the Lakemore petition was passed by 90.5% of the voters of Springfield
Township. A public hearing was held on the Lakemore petition. In May, 1980 the Supreme
Court of Ohio affirmed the decision of the court of appeals granting the writ of mandamus.
Holcomb v. Bd. of Summit Co. Conm'rs I, 62 Ohio St.2d 241, 405 N.E.2d 262 (1980).
However, by this time the statutory time limits for all the petitions had passed, so the court
ordered the Board to decide the petitions in the order in which they would have been
decided had the statutes been followed. On June 3, 1980, the Board made the following
decisions: it granted Goodyear, it denied Gilchrist I, it "filed" Gilchrist II and it granted
Lakemore. The Agent for petitioners filed for an injunction against the Lakemore petition,
arguing that Gilchrist R should have been set for hearing and decided before the Board
took any action on Lakemore. The Court of Appeals sustained the Agent's position in
Holcomb v. Bd. of Summit Co. Comm'rs II, No. 9822, Summit Co. Ct. App. filed Jan.
21, 1981), ordering the Lakemore petition enjoined until a decision was reached in Gilchrist II.
Further complicating the matter was the fact that on January 1, 1981, the Summit County
Charter went into effect, replacing the Board of Comxnission- er with a County Executive
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sioners rendered its decisions. It approved the petition filed by Goodyear
Aerospace, making all of the requisite factual findings, and it denied the
Gilchrist Road petition, finding that the map was not accurate, that a majori-
ty of landowners had not signed the petition,69 that the general good of the
territory would not be served and that the territory was unreasonably large.
In the Goodyear matter, the Trustees of Springfield Township filed a peti-
tion for an injunction against the annexation in the Summit County Court
of Common Pleas.7" In the Gilchrist matter, the petitioners filed an admin-
istrative appeal.7' In each case, the court affirmed the decision of the Board.
Both rulings were appealed. 2
The heart of the opponent's argument in these two cases was that both
territories should have been considered unreasonably large under the analy-
sis found in the Herrick opinion. Their prime contention was economic: that
the tax loss to the Township by either"3 of these proposed annexations would
render it incapable of supporting itself. Substantial evidence was introduced
in the lower court as to the economic value of these parcels. For example,
in 1979, the total assessed real and tangible personal property value of the
Goodyear Aerospace complex was approximately $22,000,000.00, almost
fifteen percent of the total assessed value of the entire Township. It generated
over $100,000.00 in tax revenue for the Township. The Gilchrist Road
property was valued at over $24,000,000.00 and produced nearly
$120,000.00 in tax dollars." The opponents argued that the combination of
and a County Council. No one is quite sure who is to make annexation decisions. The
Agent for petitioners and the City of Akron have also filed petitions for injunctions
against the Lakemore petition, which are now pending in Summit County Common Pleas
Court.
69 An interesting point has emerged as to whether there was a majority of owners signing
the petition. There were nine signatures of what the petitioners thought to be sixteen
owners. Research by the opponents, however, yielded two more owners, one of whom was
the Board of Summit County Commissioners themselves! The Board was record title holder
to a small pump station in the territory to be annexed. The petitioners have argued
that the Board should not be counted since it does not fit into one of the categories of
owners defined in OImo R v. CODE ANN. § 709.02 (Page Supp. 1980). Opponents have
argued that the Board is an owner because it holds property in trust for the public. See note
23 supra, and [1980] Op. Atty Gen. No. 80-034.
10OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 709.07 (Page Supp. 1980); Carlyn v. Davis, No. 80-6-1596
(C.P. Summit Co., Aug. 11, 1980).
71 OHio REv. CODE ANN. Ch. 2506 (Page Supp. 1979). In re Annexation of 247.5 Acres,
No. 80-6-1560 (C.P. Summit Co., Aug. 11, 1980).
72 In Carlyn v. Davis, the Summit County Court of Appeals held that the Springfield Town-
ship Trustees did not have standing to file an action pursuant to Omo REV. CODE ANN. §
709.07 (Page Supp. 1980) and, therefore, did not rule on the merits of petitioner's argu-
ments. In Gilchrist, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling, holding that
the Board of Summit County Commissioners were owners within the meaning of OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 709.02 (Page 1976 & Supp. 1980) and that therefore the petition did
not contain a majority of the owners. See note 69 supra.
73 These cases were argued and briefed separately so that the combined economic effect
of the two annexations was never considered.
4 These figures were supplied by the office of the Summit County Auditor.
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these figures with a dwindling of other revenues, especially those from the
federal government, rendered the annexation unreasonably large. If the
Township were to attempt to recover these losses through increased property
tax rates, the effect on the taxpayers would be a double one. Not only
would the tax rate have to be increased to compensate for the immediate
loss of revenue, but any tax increase in the future would have to be propor-
tionately higher in order to accommodate for the loss in the tax base. The
residents of Springfield Township are largely lower-middle class, blue-collar
workers already suffering from high inflation and unemployment. The an-
nexation opponents argued that it would be unconscionable to require these
people to financially support the decision of a few corporations to annex
their land. They also argued that the Gilchrist property was already devel-
oped and, thus, unsuited to Akron's growth needs, so the holding of the
court in Dayton v. McPherson, that similar territory was unreasonably large,
should be followed.
The proponents countered these arguments in several ways. First, they
argued that Herrick should be overruled because its holding conflicts with
the holding of the supreme court in Lariccia that the emphasis in annexation
proceedings be on the general good of the territory. Second, they contended
that the opponents failed to show that annexation of either property would
render the Township incapable of supporting itself. Third, it was maintained
that even if the court were to find that the annexation would render the
Township incapable of supporting itself, the language of Herrick makes
the finding that the territory is unreasonably large discretionary."' Finally,
they argued that the enactment of a new statue"' by the General Assembly
precluded the Board (or the courts) from considering economic evidence.
This statute provides for payment to the township by a municipal corpora-
tion of any tax money generated by the annexed territory if the township has
lost more than fifteen percent of its assessed value to annexation. These
payments continue over a limited number of years and the percentage of
tax money paid decreases over those years. 7 The proponents argued that by
enacting this statute, the legislature removed any economic objections which
a township may have to annexation. The problem with such a contention
is that this statute is merely a stop-gap measure designed to ease the eco-
nomic burden on the townships. Since, under the present governmental
structure in Ohio, townships have virtually no means to quickly acquire
new sources of income, they can only generate income through long-term
75 The court stated, "[tlhen the Board might reasonably conclude the proposed annexation
is unreasonably large." No. 9425 slip op. at 6 (Summit Co. Ct. App. filed Jan. 23, 1980).
76 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 709.19 (Page Supp. 1980).
77 For example, if a city annexes more than 15% of the assessed value of a township
during one year, it must reimburse the township for the tax money lost by the annexation
on the following scale: the first 3 years, 100%; the 4th year, 80%; the 5th year, 60%; the
6th year, 40%; and the 7th year 2Q%, Owo REv. CODE ANN. § 709.19(b) (Page Supp.
1980).
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development of township land.' Thus, if an annexation would bankrupt
a township in 1980, it is very likely that it would bankrupt it in 1987 when the
payments from the city ceased. If a board of county commissioners finds
that a particular annexation is unreasonably large for the reasons described
herein, it should deny the petition despite any payments which the township
might otherwise have received.
There is more at stake in these cases than millions of dollars worth of
property. If the court is willing to grant the board of county commissioners
more discretion in annexation proceedings through an expanded definition
of unreasonably large, then perhaps annexation will be less of a problem in
Ohio. There is a strong need to allow the board to inject some local values
into their decision-making process, especially when the parties seeking an-
nexation are corporations with few ties to the community. Perhaps then
cities would adopt long-range annexation programs and stop annexing terri-
tory for the sake of annexing. Such a situation could only benefit the whole
state.
V. OTHER APPROACHES To FIGHTING ANNEXATION
As seen from the foregoing discussion, legal attacks on annexation are
generally losing propositions. Opponents of annexation have, consequently,
turned to other spheres to fight annexation. One such sphere is the legislature.
Although attempts to make wholesale revisions in the annexation law have
generally failed,"' recent legislative enactments have assisted townships.
Provisions such as the tax revenue repayment provision discussed above, the
expansion of the class of individuals eligible to seek an injunction against
annexation, 0 and the permission given township trustees to expend general
funds to hire an attorney to represent them in annexation proceedings"' are
good examples. Townships have also attempted to fight annexation by merg-
ing with other townships or seeking wholesale annexation to neighboring
villages. This allows for incorporation without the residents losing most of
their local control. Since annexation from one municipal corporation to
7 8 The warehouse complex from which the Gilchrist Road territory is sought to be an-
nexed is a good example of such a development, having been nurtured and cultivated over
a number of years.
19 Recently introduced H.B. 16, 113th Ohio Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (1980) is an example of an
attempt at major revision. It provides:
1) All of the owners of property adjacent to the municipal corporation must sign the
petition.
2) The agent must live in the territory to be annexed. This provision makes it im-
possible to annex undeveloped land.
3) County Commissioners would be given additional discretion to reject petitions as
follows: Territory must adjoin the municipal corporation at more than one spot;
an annexation cannot contain a narrow strip of land in order to join otherwise non-
contiguous territory (cities have annexed railroad and utilities right of way to gain
access to non-contiguous territory); and proposed annexation can separate any part
of the township from the remainder of the township.
8 0 0mo REV. CoDE ANN. § 709.07 (Page Supp 1980).
81 Id. § 505.62,
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another is a difficult procedure,8" such measures can sometimes be an ef-
fective block against annexation. They are limited, however, by geographic
realities.
There is a third weapon in the arsenal of annexation opponents which
was only recently discovered and which has not yet been tested. On January
1, 1981, Summit County became the first entity in Ohio to adopt a charter
pursuant to the Ohio Constitution.8" Several interesting questions as to the
effect of this charter on annexation in the county have been raised. First,
do the provisions of the charter make the county a municipal corporation
under Ohio law, so that all annexations in Summit County must proceed
under the provisions for annexation from one municipal corporation to an-
other? Second, does the charter allow the county to set its own standards
for annexation? Third, is the annexation decision a legislative action such
that it is subject to referendum and initiative by the voters? The answers to
these questions may provide the townships with a very strong weapon in their
attempt to hold back the tide of annexation. "
VI. CONCLUSION
Annexation can be one of the most effective means to permit a city to
expand its borders and to provide municipal services to outlying areas. De-
spite its benefits, however, in Ohio it remains a source of conflict between
city and township. In some areas of this state, this conflict has degenerated
into an irrational hatred between the parties, making efficient local govern-
ment a virtual impossibility. Although neither party is without blame, the true
source of difficulty in this area is the law itself. No one can fault city ad-
ministrations, in attempting to provide for their own needs, for taking ad-
vantage of a statutory scheme that allows annexation to proceed virtually
unchecked. At the same time, township officials should not be blamed for
fighting annexation attempts which they see as contrary to the best interests
of their constituents. Therefore, as long as the present statutory scheme re-
mains intact, the battle will proceed unchanged. What is needed is a structure
that allows annexation to proceed when it can aid the normal developmental
needs of a city or when it will extend needed municipal services, but that
prevents the annexation of land unsuited for development where the only
reason for annexation is to increase the tax base of the city. It is these latter
annexation attempts which the township officials are determined to stop.
Obviously, the implementation of such a structure will not totally eliminate
82 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 709.22-.37 (Page 1976 & Supp. 1980).
83 Ohio Const. art. X, § 9.
84 Some of these issues will be litigated in a recently filed declaratory judgment action,
Azar v. County of Summit, No. 80-3-0733 (C.P. Summit Co., filed Mar. 27, 1981). This
action was filed by the Trustees of Northampton Township as part of their opposition to
a proposed annexation to the City of Akron of approximately 1600 acres, including the
Blossom Music Center, summer home of the Cleveland Orchestra.
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the animosity which exists as a result of annexation. Whenever municipal
borders expand, there is bound to be resistance.
It is possible, however, that a scheme which curtails unwarranted an-
nexations will force cities to adopt long-range programs to be completed
with the cooperation of township and county governments. These changes
can be accomplished in two ways. The first is legislative. A complete revision
of the statutes, providing for more discretion at the county level as well as
greater judicial scrutiny, is the best way to afford protection to the rights of
all parties involved in annexations. Meanwhile, some changes can be made
by the judiciary. If the courts were to allow the county commissioners to con-
sider, when determining whether a territory is unreasonably large, such fac-
tors as the economic effect of the annexation, the susceptibility of the terri-
tory to development by the annexing city, and whether the annexation is in
the best interests of the entire metropolitan area, then perhaps annexation
will be less a source of conflict and townships and cities can begin to coop-
erate in local government.
There is a deeper issue involved here, however, which this comment
has scarcely examined: the viability of the township as a form of local gov-
ernment in an urban society. Under the present system, townships are no
more than caretakers of unincorporated territory, holding it until a city is
ready to institute annexation proceedings. In a rural setting, there are few
problems with this scheme. In recent years, however, many townships have
become increasingly more urbanized. As a result, township governments
have been called upon to provide much more in the way of municipal serv-
ices. In order to generate revenue to provide these services they have sought
to increase their tax base through the development of industrial and/or
commercial complexes within township borders only to see those develop-
ments, upon completion, annexed by neighboring municipal corporations.
In the end, it is the township resident who suffers when he or she pays for
these developments through property taxes but receives no benefit from them
when they are annexed. Townships could become a viable form of local gov-
ernment only if they are afforded some protection by the General Assembly.
HOWARD S. ESSNER
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